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STOCHASTIC SELECTION PROCESSES
ALEX MCAVOY
Abstract. We propose a mathematical framework for natural selection in finite populations. Traditionally,
many of the selection-based processes used to describe cultural and genetic evolution (such as imitation
and birth-death models) have been studied on a case-by-case basis. Over time, these models have grown
in sophistication to include population structure, differing phenotypes, and various forms of interaction
asymmetry, among other features. Furthermore, many processes inspired by natural selection, such as
evolutionary algorithms in computer science, possess characteristics that should fall within the realm of a
“selection process,” but so far there is no overarching theory encompassing these evolutionary processes. The
framework of stochastic selection processes we present here provides such a theory and consists of three main
components: a population state space, an aggregate payoff function, and an update rule. A population state
space is a generalization of the notion of population structure, and it can include non-spatial information
such as strategy-mutation rates and phenotypes. An aggregate payoff function allows one to generically talk
about the fitness of traits without explicitly specifying a method of payoff accounting or even the nature
of the interactions that determine payoff/fitness. An update rule is a fitness-based function that updates
a population based on its current state, and it includes as special cases the classical update mechanisms
(Moran, Wright-Fisher, etc.) as well as more complicated mechanisms involving chromosomal crossover,
mutation, and even complex cultural syntheses of strategies of neighboring individuals. Our framework
covers models with variable population size as well as with arbitrary, measurable trait spaces.
1. Introduction
Evolutionary game theory has proven itself extremely useful for modeling both cultural and genetic
evolution (Maynard Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Dugatkin, 2000; Nowak, 2006). Traits, which
are represented as strategies, determine the fitness of the players. An individual’s fitness might be determined
solely by his or her strategy (frequency-independent fitness) or it might also depend on the traits of the other
players in the population (frequency-dependent fitness). The population evolves via a fitness-based update
mechanism, and the long-run behavior of this process can be studied to determine which traits are more
successful than others.
Evolutionary game theory was first used to study evolution in infinite populations via deterministic
replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978). More recently, the dynamics of evolutionary games have also
been studied in finite populations (Nowak et al., 2004; Taylor et al., 2004). Finite-population evolutionary
dynamics typically have two timescales: one for interactions and one for updates. A player has a strategy
(trait) and interacts with his or her neighbors in order to receive a payoff. In a birth-death process, for
instance, this payoff is converted to reproductive fitness and used to update the population as follows:
First, a player is chosen from the population for reproduction with probability proportional to (relative)
fitness. Next, a player is chosen uniformly at random from the population for death, and the offspring of the
reproducing player replaces the deceased player. This birth-death process is a frequency-dependent version
of the classical Moran process (Moran, 1958; Nowak, 2006).
Whereas replicator dynamics are deterministic, finite-population models of evolution are inherently sto-
chastic and incorporate principles of both natural selection and genetic drift. All biological populations are
finite, and we focus here on stochastic evolutionary games in finite populations. In particular, we focus on
selection processes, which, informally, are evolutionary processes in which the update step depends on fitness.
Selection processes typically resemble birth-death processes in that there is reproduction and replacement,
with “fitter” players more likely to reproduce than those with lower fitness. Of course, the order and number
of births and deaths may vary, and the update might instead be based on imitation instead of reproduction.
One of our goals here is to precisely define selection process in a way that captures all of the salient features
of the classical models of evolution in finite populations.
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Nowak et al. (2009) state that “There is (as yet) no general mathematical framework that would encom-
pass evolutionary dynamics for any kind of population structure.” We propose here such a framework, which
we term stochastic selection processes, to describe the evolutionary games used to model natural selection in
finite populations. Stochastic selection processes model evolutionary processes with two timescales: one for
interactions (which determine fitness) and one for updates (selection, mutation, etc.). Our framework takes
into account arbitrary population structures, as well as non-spatial information about the population such
as phenotypes and strategy mutations. Moreover, this framework encompasses all types of strategy spaces,
games (matrix, asymmetric, multiplayer, etc.), and fitness-based update rules.
An example of ambiguity in evolutionary game theory is that classical games, such as two-player matrix
games, are often used to define evolutionary processes in populations, and in this context the term “game”
can refer to either the classical game or to the evolutionary process. Moreover, classical multiplayer games,
such as the public goods game, can result in processes in which each player in the population derives a payoff
from several multiplayer interactions, and some of these interactions might involve players who are not
neighbors (see McAvoy and Hauert, 2015a). Even further, when a player is involved in multiple interactions,
the total payoff to this player may be derived in more than one way: payoffs from individual encounters may
be accumulated (added) or averaged, for instance, and the nature of this accounting can strongly influence
the evolutionary process (Maciejewski et al., 2014).
In order to accommodate the many ways of deriving “total payoff” from a classical game, one may distill
from these methods a common feature: each player has a strategy and receives an aggregate payoff from
a sequence of interactions. That is, if S is the strategy space available to each of the N players in the
population, then there is an aggregate payoff function, u : SN Ñ RN , such that the ith coordinate function,
ui, is the payoff to player i for all of the (microscopic) interactions in which this player is involved. As an
example, consider the two-player game defined by the matrix
˜A B
A a b
B c d
¸
. (1)
Suppose that the population is well mixed so that each player interacts with every other player. Let S “
tA,Bu and let s P SN be a strategy profile consisting of k ` 1 players using A and N ´ 1´ k players using
B (the ordering is not important since the population is well mixed). If player i is an A-player, then the
payoff to this player is
uacci psq :“ ka` pN ´ 1´ kq b (2)
if payoffs are accumulated and
uavei psq :“
ka` pN ´ 1´ kq b
N ´ 1
(3)
if payoffs are averaged. These two methods of calculating payoffs from pairwise interactions give essentially
equivalent evolutionary dynamics since the population is well mixed, but this phenomenon need not hold for
more complicated methods of payoff accounting or (spatial) population structures. Evolutionary dynamics
aside, this example illustrates how one can define an aggregate payoff function, u, from a classical game such
as a 2 ˆ 2 matrix game; different methods of obtaining total payoff from a series of interactions result in
different aggregate payoff functions.
A selection process in a finite population typically has for a state space the set of all strategy profiles, i.e.
the set of all N -tuples of strategies (Allen and Tarnita, 2012). A strategy profile indicates a strategy for each
player in the population, and often an evolutionary process updates only these strategies. The population
structure may be fixed (Lieberman et al., 2005; Szabo´ and Fa´th, 2007) or dynamic (Tarnita et al., 2009;
Wardil and Hauert, 2014). (In the latter case, one must also account for the population structure in the
state space of the process.) An aggregate payoff function, which takes into account both strategies and
population structure, assigns a payoff to each player in the population. The payoff to player i, ui, is then
converted to fitness, fi “ f puiq, where f is some payoff-to-fitness function (e.g. f puiq “ exp tβuiu for some
β ě 0). A fitness-based update rule such as birth-death (Moran, 1958; Nowak et al., 2004); death-birth
or imitation (Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006); pairwise comparison (Szabo´ and To˝ke, 1998;
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Traulsen et al., 2007); or Wright-Fisher (Ewens, 2004; Imhof and Nowak, 2006) is then repeatedly applied to
the population, at each step updating the strategies of the players and (possibly) the population structure.
Based on this pattern, it seems reasonable to define the state of an evolutionary process to be a pair, ps,Γq,
where s is an N -tuple of strategies and Γ is a population structure. However, there may be more to the state
of a population than its spatial structure. For example, Antal et al. (2009) consider evolution in phenotype
space, a model in which each player has both a strategy and a phenotype, and phenotypes influence the
effects of strategies on interactions. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, for instance, a cooperator (whose strategy
is C) cooperates only with other players who are phenotypically similar and defects otherwise. In this
instance, we show how one can consider phenotypes as a part of the “population state” in the sense that
they contain information about the players in the population. In general, a state of the evolutionary process
can be represented by a pair, ps,Pq, where s is a strategy profile and P is a population state (which we
make mathematically precise). Notably, the population state is distinct from the strategies of the players; it
describes all of the non-strategy information about the players.
When viewed from this perspective, the effects of phenotypes on strategies can be implemented directly
in the aggregate payoff function, u: a player facing a cooperator receives the payoff for facing a cooperator
if and only if they are phenotypically similar. Similarly, strategy mutations can also be considered as a
part of the population state and accounted for directly in the update step of the process. As a part of our
analysis, we formally define aggregate payoff function and update rule and show how they are influenced by
the components of the population state.
This setup, which involves a series of interactions as the population transitions through various states,
is reminiscent of a stochastic game (Shapley, 1953). A stochastic game is played in stages, with each stage
consisting of a normal-form game determined by some “state.” The game played in the subsequent stage is
determined probabilistically by the current state as well as the strategies played in the current stage. We
will see that, in general, selection processes are not necessarily stochastic games, and neither are stochastic
games necessarily selection processes. However, these two types of processes do share some common features,
and we use some of the components of a stochastic game as inspiration for our framework.
Many problems in evolution, such as how and why cooperation evolves, depend on the specifics of the up-
date rule, population structure, mutation rates, etc. (Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2007; Traulsen et al.,
2009; De´barre et al., 2014; Rand et al., 2014). We clarify how these pieces (among others) fit together. Our
objective here is threefold: (1) to compare and contrast evolutionary and stochastic games, drawing inspira-
tion from the latter to describe the former; (2) to propose a general mathematical framework encompassing
natural selection models in finite populations; and (3) to examine the components of several classical evo-
lutionary processes and demonstrate how they fit into our framework. Many (if not most) of the existing
models of evolution in finite populations involve a fixed population size. Therefore, our framework is first
stated in terms of a fixed population size since this setting most readily allows for a comparison to the
theory of stochastic games and for illustrative examples placing several standard evolutionary processes into
a broader context. However, the assumption that the population size is fixed is not crucial to our theory,
and we conclude by extending our framework to processes with variable population size.
2. Stochastic games
Prior to outlining the basic theory of stochastic games, we first need to recall some definitions and notation.
A measurable space consists of a set, X , and a σ-algebra of sets, F pXq, on X . Often, we refer to X itself as
a “measurable space” and suppress F pXq. If X is a measurable space, then we denote by ∆ pXq the space
of probability measures on X ; that is, if M pXq is the space of all measures on pX,F pXqq, then
∆ pXq :“ tµ PM pXq : µ pXq “ 1u . (4)
For measurable spacesX and Y , denote byK pX,Y q the set of Markov kernels fromX to Y ; that is, K pX,Y q
is the set of functions κ : X ˆF pY q Ñ r0, 1s such that (i) κ px,´q : F pY q Ñ r0, 1s is in ∆ pY q for each x P X
and (ii) κ p´, Eq : X Ñ r0, 1s is measurable for each E P F pY q. We also write κ : X Ñ ∆ pY q to denote such
a kernel.
Shapley (1953) considers a collection of normal-form games, together with a probabilistic rule for transi-
tioning between these games, which he refers to as a stochastic game. A stochastic game is a generalization
of a repeated game that, formally, consists of the following components:
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(i) N players, labeled 1, . . . , N ;
(ii) for each player, i, a measurable strategy space, Si;
(iii) a measurable state space, P;
(iv) a “single-period” payoff function, u : S ˆ P Ñ RN , where ui is the payoff to player i and S :“
S1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ SN is the set of all strategy profiles ;
(v) a transition kernel, T : Sˆ PÑ ∆ pPq.
A Markov decision process is a stochastic game with one player (Puterman, 1994; Neyman, 2003), and a
repeated game is a stochastic game whose state space, P, consists of just a single element (McMillan, 2001;
Mertens et al., 2015).
Examples of strategies for stochastic games are the following (see Neyman and Sorin, 2003):
(1) Pure strategies : Let H denote the set of all possible histories, i.e.
H :“ t∅u Y
ğ
tě1
pSˆ Pq
t
, (5)
where ∅ denotes the “null” history and
Ů
tě1 pSˆ Pq
t
is the disjoint union of the spaces of t-tuples,
pSˆ Pq
t
, for t ě 1. A pure strategy for player i is a map
si : H ÝÑ Si, (6)
indicating an action in Si for each t and history h
t P pSˆ Pq
t
Ď H. We denote by Map pH, Siq the
set of all such maps, i.e. the set of player i’s pure strategies.
(2) Mixed strategies: A mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution over the set of pure
strategies for player i, i.e. an element σi P ∆ pMap pH, Siqq.
(3) Behavioral strategies : A behavioral strategy for player i is a map
σi : H ÝÑ ∆ pSiq , (7)
indicating a distribution over Si for each t and history h
t P pSˆ Pq
t
Ď H.
(4) Markov strategies : A Markov strategy for player i is a behavioral strategy, σi, such that σi ph
tq “
σi pk
tq for each t and ht, kt P pSˆ Pq
t
Ď H with htt “ k
t
t . In other words, a Markov strategy is a
“memory-one” behavioral strategy, i.e. a behavioral strategy that depends on only the last strategy
profile, state, and t.
(5) Stationary strategies : A stationary strategy is a Markov strategy that is independent of t, i.e. a
behavioral strategy that depends on only the last strategy profile and state.
Of these five classes of strategies, behavioral strategies are the most general. Indeed, pure, mixed, Markov,
and stationary strategies are all instances of behavioral strategies. In the context of repeated games, a
memory-one strategy of the repeated game (Press and Dyson, 2012) is equivalent to a stationary strategy
of the stochastic game, and a longer-memory strategy of the repeated game (Hauert and Schuster, 1997) is
equivalent to a behavioral strategy.
2.1. Evolutionary processes as stochastic games. At first glance, stochastic games seem to provide
a reasonable framework for evolutionary games: a stochastic game transitions through states in stages
(“periods”), which could be population structures or states, and in each stage the players receive payoffs
based on a single-period payoff function, u. However, it is in the dynamics that the differences between
stochastic and evolutionary games become evident:
The combination of a stochastic game and a strategy for each player defines a stochastic process on SˆP,
although this stochastic process might or might not be a Markov chain. For example, let T be the transition
kernel for a stochastic game, and suppose that σi is a stationary strategy for player i for i “ 1, . . . , N . Let
κ be the transition kernel on Sˆ P defined by the product measure, i.e.
κ : Sˆ P ÝÑ ∆ pSˆ Pq
: ps,Pq ÞÝÑ σ1 rs,Ps ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ σN rs,Ps ˆ T rs,Ps . (8)
Thus, the stochastic game–together with this profile of stationary strategies–defines a time-homogeneous
Markov chain on S ˆ P. In general, if these strategies are instead Markov strategies, then the resulting
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Markov chain might be time-inhomogeneous. If these strategies are pure, mixed, or behavioral, then the
stochastic process on Sˆ P defined by the game need not even be a Markov chain.
Evolutionary processes are typically defined as Markov chains on Sˆ P, where P is chosen to be a state
space appropriate for the evolutionary process (such as the space of population structures, mutation-rate
profiles, or phenotype profiles). In light of the previous remarks, it is not unreasonable to expect that many
of these processes are equivalent to stochastic games combined with stationary strategies. As it turns out,
evolutionary processes generally possess correlations between updates of strategies and population states,
forbidding an equivalence between an evolutionary process and a Markov chain constructed from a stochastic
game via Eq. (8). These correlations are evident already in one of the most basic models of evolution in
finite populations:
Example 1 (Moran process). Suppose that S “ tA,Bu, where strategy A represents the mutant type and
strategy B represents the wild type. A mutant type has fitness r ą 0 relative to the wild type (whose fitness
relative to itself is just 1). Let m be a finite subset of r0, 1s consisting of a number of “mutation rates,” and
let P :“ mN . In a well-mixed population of size N , the Moran process proceeds as follows: In each time step,
an individual (“player”) is chosen for reproduction with probability proportional to relative fitness. Another
player (including the one chosen for reproduction) is then chosen uniformly at random from the population
for death. The offspring of the player chosen for reproduction replaces the deceased player. If player i is
chosen for reproduction and εi P m is this player’s mutation rate, then the offspring of this player inherits
the type of the parent with probability 1 ´ εi and takes on a type uniformly at random from tA,Bu with
probability εi. The mutation rate of the offspring is εi, which is inherited directly from the parent. Thus,
a state of this process consists of a profile of types (“strategies”), s P SN , and a profile of mutation rates,
ε P P “ mN .
A transition between states ps, εq and ps1, ε1q is possible only if there exists j such that sℓ “ s
1
ℓ and εℓ “ ε
1
ℓ
for each ℓ ‰ j. If player i is selected for reproduction and player j is chosen for death, then it must be the
case that εi “ ε
1
j . If δs,t “ 1 when s “ t (and is 0 otherwise), then the probability that player i is selected
for reproduction is
rδsi,A ` δsi,BřN
ℓ“1 prδsℓ,A ` δsℓ,Bq
. (9)
The probability that player j is chosen for death is 1{N . If the offspring of player i inherits the strategy of
the parent, then it must be true that si “ s
1
j . Otherwise, the offspring of player i “mutates” and adopts
strategy s1j with probability 1{2. Therefore, the probability of transitioning between states ps, εq and ps
1, ε1q
is
Tps,εq,ps1,ε1q “
Nÿ
i,j“1
˜ź
ℓ‰j
δsℓ,s1ℓδεℓ,ε
1
ℓ
¸
δεi,ε1j
ˆ
˜
rδsi,A ` δsi,BřN
ℓ“1 prδsℓ,A ` δsℓ,Bq
¸ˆ
1
N
˙„
p1´ εiq δsi,s1j ` εi
ˆ
1
2
˙
. (10)
By Eq. (10), the distributions on SN and P, respectively, are not independent.
More formally, consider a Markov chain on S ˆ P defined by some evolutionary process such as the
Moran process of Example 1, and let κ be its transition kernel. The projection maps Π1 : S ˆ P Ñ S and
Π2 : Sˆ PÑ P produce pushforward maps
pΠ1q˚ : ∆ pSˆ Pq ÝÑ ∆ pSq
: µ ÞÝÑ µ ˝Π´1
1
; (11a)
pΠ2q˚ : ∆ pSˆ Pq ÝÑ ∆ pPq
: µ ÞÝÑ µ ˝Π´1
2
. (11b)
From κ, we obtain a transition kernel for a stochastic game, T , defined by
T rs,Ps :“ pΠ2q˚ κ rs,Ps (12)
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for each s P S and P P P. Similarly, we obtain the (stationary) strategy profile
σ rs,Ps :“ pΠ1q˚ κ rs,Ps . (13)
However, one typically loses information in passing from such a Markov chain to the combination of a
stochastic game and a profile of stationary strategies. First of all, the transition kernel κ generally cannot
be reconstructed from T and σ since κ rs,Ps need not be in ∆ pSq ˆ ∆ pPq; a priori, we know only that
κ rs,Ps P ∆ pSˆ Pq for s P S and P P P (see Eq. (10), for example). Moreover, σ need not be of the
form pσ1, . . . , σN q for stationary strategies σ1, . . . , σN ; in particular, σ is a correlated stationary profile (see
Aumann, 1987; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). In other words, whereas a sequence of independent strategy
choices produce an element´
σ1 rs,Ps , . . . , σN rs,Ps
¯
P ∆ pS1q ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ∆ pSN q , (14)
it might be the case that σ rs,Ps P ∆ pS1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ SN q ´
´
∆ pS1q ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ∆ pSN q
¯
.
In §3, we present a framework for stochastic evolutionary processes used to model natural selection.
These processes, which we call stochastic selection processes, illustrate more clearly the correlations between
distributions on S and P arising in many evolutionary processes. We saw in Example 1 that, despite the
similarities between stochastic games and evolutionary processes, there are important differences between
the two frameworks. However, our notion of a stochastic selection process draws inspiration from the theory
of stochastic games. Namely, we appropriate the concepts of (i) state space, P; (ii) single-period payoff
function, u; and (iii) update step.
3. Stochastic selection processes with fixed population size
Here we focus on a type of evolutionary process that we term a stochastic selection process. Stochastic
selection processes seek to model processes with two timescales: one for interactions and one for selection.
In the interaction step, players interact with one another and receive payoffs based on their strategies. In the
selection step, the population is updated probabilistically based on the current population and the players’
payoffs. Selection processes provide a general framework for the evolutionary games used to model processes
based on natural selection (Maynard Smith, 1982).
Roughly speaking, the processes modeled by evolutionary game theory may be split into two classes:
cultural and genetic (McAvoy and Hauert, 2015c). In cultural processes, there is a fixed set of players
who repeatedly revise their strategies based on some update rule (such as imitation). In genetic processes,
strategies are updated via reproduction and genetic inheritance. Naturally, a process need not be one or
the other; there may be both cultural and genetic components in an evolutionary process. Unlike purely
cultural processes, those with a genetic component have the property that the players themselves, as well
as the size of the population, may actually change via births and deaths, thus it does not make sense to
speak of a fixed population of players as in requirement (i) of a stochastic game. However, one can choose
an arbitrary enumeration of the players in each step of the process and refer to the player labeled i at time
n as “player i.” Of course, player i at time m and player i at time n ‰ m might be different, but a stochastic
selection process is a Markov chain and the transition kernel can be defined for any enumeration of the
players at a given time. The implicit property that natural selection does not depend on the enumeration of
the players must be stated formally in terms of the update rule. Informally, the update rule for a stochastic
selection process must satisfy a symmetry condition that guarantees the dynamics do not depend on these
enumerations.
As an example, an evolutionary process based on a game with two-strategies in a well-mixed population
may be modeled as a Markov chain whose state space is t0, 1, . . . , Nu (Nowak, 2006). If S “ tA,Bu is
the strategy set, then the state of the population is determined by the number of A-players, which is just
an integer i P t0, 1, . . . , Nu. Alternatively, one may choose an arbitrary enumeration of the players and
represent the state of the population as an element ps1, . . . , sNq P S
N . Since the population is well mixed,
evolutionary dynamics depend on only the frequency of each strategy in the population, so any two states
ps1, . . . , sN q and ps
1
1, . . . , s
1
N q consisting of the same number of A-players should be indistinguishable. In
other words, if T is the transition matrix for an evolutionary game in this population, then Tπs,τs1 “ Ts,s1
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for each s, s1 P SN and π, τ P SN , where SN acts on S
N by permuting the coordinates. Thus, the Markov
chain is more naturally defined on the quotient space
S :“ SN{SN , (15)
which is isomorphic to t0, 1, . . . , Nu when S “ tA,Bu. (Recall that an action of a group, G, on a set, X , gives
an equivalence relation, „, on X , which is defined by x „ x1 if and only if there exists g P G with x1 “ gx.
The quotient space, X{G, is defined as the set of equivalence classes under „, and the class containing
x is denoted by “x mod G.”) Of course, one may consider strategy spaces with more than two strategies:
Suppose that S “ tA1, . . . , Anu, and, for each r “ 1, . . . , n, let ψr : S
N Ñ t0, 1, . . . , Nu be the map sending
a strategy profile, s P SN , to the number of players using strategy Ar in s. Since ϕr pπsq “ ϕr psq for each
π P SN and s P S
N , the map
Ψ : SN ÝÑ
!
pk1, . . . , knq P t0, 1, . . . , Nu
N : k1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` kn “ N
)
: s ÞÝÑ
´
ψ1 psq , . . . , ψn psq
¯
(16)
descends to an isomorphism
rΨ : SN{SN ÝÑ !pk1, . . . , knq P t0, 1, . . . , NuN : k1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` kn “ N) . (17)
Since an evolutionary update rule may be defined on the space of strategy-frequency profiles,!
pk1, . . . , knq P t0, 1, . . . , Nu
N : k1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` kn “ N
)
, (18)
we see once again that the Markov chain defined by an evolutionary process in this population naturally has
SN{SN for a state space. We show here that this phenomenon generalizes to arbitrary types of populations
and update rules. In the process of establishing this general construction, we must formally define population
state (§3.1) and update rule (§3.3).
We first assume that the population size, N , is fixed. This assumption allows us to place many of the
classical (fixed population size) stochastic evolutionary processes into the context of our framework. After
discussing the components of a selection process and giving several examples, we formally define stochastic
selection process in its full generality (covering populations of variable size) in §4.
Just like a stochastic game, a stochastic selection process consists of a measurable state space, P, and a
strategy space for each player. We assume that
S1 “ S2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ SN “: S, (19)
so that S “ SN . This assumption that the players all have the same strategy space is not restrictive since
the dynamics of the process define the evolution of strategies; one can just enlarge each player’s strategy
space if necessary and let the dynamics ensure that those strategies that are not available to a given player
are never used. Before discussing these dynamics, we first need to explore the state space, P:
3.1. Population states. We seek to appropriate the idea of a state space, P, of a stochastic game in order
to introduce population structure into an evolutionary process. In fact, a population’s spatial structure (such
as a graph) is just one component of this space; mutation rates or phenotypes may also be included in this
space. Therefore, rather than declaring P to be a space of population structures, we say that P is the space
of population states. A population state indicates properties of the players and relationships between the
players. (Note that “population state” in this context does not include the strategies of the players in the
population.) If one enumerates these players differently, then there should be a corresponding “relabeling” of
the population state so that these properties and relationships are preserved. Since changing the enumeration
of the population amounts to applying an element of SN (the symmetric group on N letters) to t1, . . . , Nu,
it follows that P must be equipped with a group action of SN . Thus, if s P S
N is a strategy profile of the
population and P P P is a population state, then the pair ps,Pq represents the same population of players
as pπs, πPq whenever π P SN . In other words, the population state space, P “ PN , which we write with a
subscript to indicate the population size, is a measurable SN -space. More formally:
7
Definition 1. A population state space for a set of N players is a measurable space, PN , equipped with an
action of SN in such a way that the map π : PN Ñ PN is measurable for each π P SN . If PN is a population
state space for a set of N players, then a population state for these players is simply an element P P PN .
3.1.1. Examples.
Example 2 (Graphs). Consider the set of N ˆN , nonnegative matrices over R,
P
G
N :“
 
Γ P RNˆN : Γij ě 0 for each i, j “ 1, . . . , N
(
, (20)
equipped with an action of SN defined by pπΓqij “ Γπpiqπpjq. An element Γ P P
G
N defines a directed, weighted
graph whose vertices are t1, . . . , Nu, with an edge from i to j if and only if Γij ‰ 0 (the weight of the edge
is then Γij). Γ is undirected if Γij “ Γji for each i and j, and Γ is unweighted if Γ P t0, 1u
NˆN
.
Example 3 (Sets). A set-structured population consists of a finite number of sets, each containing some
subset of the population, such that each player is in at least one set (Tarnita et al., 2009). Set-structured
populations may be modeled using relations:
P
S
N :“
!
R Ď t1, . . . , Nu ˆ t1, . . . , Nu : R is reflexive and symmetric
)
. (21)
That is, if R P PSN , then pi, iq P R for each i (“reflexive”) and pi, jq P R if and only if pj, iq P R (“symmetric”).
R P PSN defines a set-structure with i and j in a common set if and only if pi, jq P R. There is a natural
action of SN on P
S
N defined by
pi, jq P πR ðñ pπi, πjq P R, (22)
which makes PSN into a population state space.
Example 4 (Demes). A deme-structure on a population is a subdivision of the population into subpop-
ulations, or “demes” (Taylor et al., 2001; Wakeley and Takahashi, 2004; Hauert and Imhof, 2012). Similar
to set-structured populations, deme-structured populations may be modeled using relations (but with the
stronger notion of equivalence relation):
P
D
N :“
!
R Ď t1, . . . , Nu ˆ t1, . . . , Nu : R is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive
)
. (23)
PDN Ď P
S
N , and whereas a set-structured population may have overlapping sets, a deme-structured population
has disjoint sets. The additional transitivity requirement guarantees that these sets partition t1, . . . , Nu.
The action of SN on P
D
N is the one inherited from P
S
N , making P
D
N into a population state space.
So far, we have considered population structures that describe spatial and qualitative relationships between
the players. One could also associate to the players quantities such as mutation rates or phenotypes :
Example 5 (Mutation rates). Consider a process in which updates are based on births and deaths (such as a
Moran or Wright-Fisher process). Moreover, suppose that the spatial structure of the population is a graph.
If player i reproduces, then with probability εi the offspring adopts a novel strategy uniformly at random
(“mutates”), and with probability 1 ´ εi the offspring inherits the strategy of the parent. The mutation
rate, εi, is passed on directly from parent to offspring. The population state space for this process is then
PN :“ P
G
Nˆr0, 1s
N
; a population state consists of (i) a graph, indicating the spatial relationships between the
players, and (ii) a profile of mutation rates, ε P r0, 1s
N
, with εi indicating the probability that the offspring
of player i mutates. For update rules based on imitation, mutation rates might more appropriately be called
“exploration rates,” and they are implemented slightly differently. In general, mutation rates appear in
different forms and help to distinguish cultural and genetic update rules; we give several examples in §3.3.
The upshot of this discussion is that a population state may consist of a spatial structure, such as a graph
in PGN , as well as some extra information pertaining to the players, such as mutation rates.
Example 6 (Phenotype space). In addition to strategies, the players may also have phenotypes that affect
interactions with other players in the population (Antal et al., 2009; Nowak et al., 2009). If the spatial
structure of the population is a graph and the phenotype of each player is a one-dimensional discrete quantity,
then one may define the population state space to be PGN ˆ Z
N . Just as with mutation rates, the rest of
the process determines how these phenotypes affect the dynamics. In §3.2, we continue this example and go
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into the details of how the inclusion of phenotypes in the population state space affects the payoffs of the
players, which can then be used to recover a model of evolution in phenotype space of Antal et al. (2009).
3.1.2. Symmetries of population states. The action of SN on PN can be used to formally define a notion of
population symmetry:
Definition 2 (Automorphism of population state). For a population state, P, in a population state space,
PN , an automorphism of P is an element π P SN such that πP “ P. The group of automorphisms of P
is Aut pPq :“ StabSN pPq, where StabSN pPq denotes the stabilizer of P under the group action of SN
on PN .
If Γ P PGN , for example, then Aut pΓq is the group of graph automorphisms of Γ in the classical sense, i.e.
the set of π P SN such that Γπpiqπpjq “ Γij for each i and j. Such automorphisms have played an important
role in the study of evolutionary games on graphs (see Taylor et al., 2007; De´barre et al., 2014). We discuss
symmetries of population states further in §5.
Now that we have a formal definition of population state space, we explore how this space influences
evolutionary dynamics. The processes we seek to model have two timescales: interactions and updates. In
§3.2, we consider the influence of the population state on interactions, and in §3.3, we define update rule and
show how the population state fits into the update step of an evolutionary process.
3.2. Aggregate payoff functions. Prior to stating the definition of a general payoff function for a sto-
chastic selection process, we consider a motivating example that is based on a popular type of game used to
model frequency-dependent fitness in evolutionary game theory:
Example 7. Consider the symmetric, two-player game whose payoff matrix is
˜ A1 A2
A1 a11 a12
A2 a21 a22
¸
. (24)
If the population structure is a graph and the population state space is PGN , then one can construct a function
u : t1, 2u
N
ˆ PGN Ñ R
N by letting ui be defined as
ui
´
ps1, . . . , sN q ,Γ
¯
:“
Nÿ
j“1
Γijasisj . (25)
That is, ui is the “aggregate payoff” function for player i since it produces the total payoff from player i’s
interactions with all of his or her neighbors, weighted appropriately by the edge weights of the population
structure. If π P SN , then
ui
´ `
sπp1q, . . . , sπpNq
˘
, πΓ
¯
“
Nÿ
j“1
Γπpiqπpjqasπpiqsπpjq
“
Nÿ
j“1
Γπpiqjasπpiqsj
“ uπpiq
´
ps1, . . . , sNq ,Γ
¯
. (26)
Therefore, although uΓ :“ u p´,Γq : t1, 2u
N
Ñ RN need not be symmetric in the sense that uΓ pπsq “ πuΓ psq
for each s P t1, 2u
N
, it is symmetric in the sense that
u pπs, πΓq “ πu ps,Γq (27)
for each s P t1, 2uN and Γ P PN “ P
G
N . In other words, all of the information that results in payoff asymmetry
is contained in the population state space, PN .
Using the function u and Eq. (27) of the previous example as motivation, we have:
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Definition 3 (Aggregate payoff function). An aggregate payoff function is a map
u : SN ˆ PN ÝÑ R
N (28)
that satisfies u pπs, πPq “ πu ps,Pq for each π P SN , s P S
N , and P P PN .
The symmetry condition in Definition 3, u pπs, πPq “ πu ps,Pq, implies that an aggregate payoff func-
tion, u, is completely determined by the map u1 : S
N ˆPN Ñ R. Indeed, if u1 is known and π P SN sends 1
to i, then ui ps,Pq “ u1 pπs, πPq for each s P S
N and P P PN , which recovers the map u : S
N ˆPN Ñ R
N .
This symmetry condition must hold even for individual encounters that are asymmetric (Example 8).
3.2.1. Examples.
Example 8. In place of (24), one could consider a collection of bimatrices,
Mij :“
˜ A1 A2
A1 a
ij
11
, a
ji
11
a
ij
12
, a
ji
21
A2 a
ij
21
, a
ji
12
a
ij
22
, a
ji
22
¸
, (29)
indexed by i, j P t1, . . . , Nu (McAvoy and Hauert, 2015c). For each i and j, Mij is the payoff matrix for
player i against player j, with the first coordinate of each entry denoting the payoff to player i and the
second coordinate denoting the payoff to player j. The collection
 
Mij
(N
i,j“1
is equivalent to an element of`
R
2ˆ2
˘NˆN
, i.e. a 2ˆ2 real matrix indicating the payoff to player i against player j for each i, j “ 1, . . . , N .
In this case, the population state space consists of more than spatial structures; it also includes the details
of the payoff-asymmetry appearing in individual encounters. In other words, if the population is graph-
structured, then a population state consists of a graph and a collection of payoff matrices of the form of Eq.
(29), i.e.
PN :“ P
G
N ˆ
`
R
2ˆ2
˘NˆN
, (30)
where the action of π P SN on
`
R
2ˆ2
˘NˆN
is π
`
Mij
˘N
i,j“1
:“
`
Mπpiqπpjq
˘N
i,j“1
. The aggregate payoff
function, u : SN ˆ PN Ñ R
N , is defined by
ui
´
ps1, . . . , sN q ,
´
Γ,
`
Mij
˘N
i,j“1
¯¯
:“
Nÿ
j“1
Γija
ij
sisj
. (31)
For π P SN , we see that
ui
´ `
sπp1q, . . . , sπpNq
˘
, π
´
Γ,
`
Mij
˘N
i,j“1
¯¯
“
Nÿ
j“1
Γπpiqπpjqa
πpiqπpjq
sπpiqsπpjq
“
Nÿ
j“1
Γπpiqja
πpiqj
sπpiqsj
“ uπpiq
´
ps1, . . . , sN q ,
´
Γ,
`
Mij
˘N
i,j“1
¯¯
, (32)
so u defines an aggregate payoff function in the sense of Definition 3.
Remark 1. For a fixed collection,
`
Mij
˘N
i,j“1
, we could have instead let PN “ P
G
N and
ui
´
ps1, . . . , sN q ,Γ
¯
:“
Nÿ
j“1
Γija
ij
sisj
. (33)
However, for π P SN , we would then have
ui
´ `
sπp1q, . . . , sπpNq
˘
, πΓ
¯
“
Nÿ
j“1
Γπpiqja
iπ´1pjq
sπpiqsj
; (34a)
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uπpiq
´
ps1, . . . , sN q ,Γ
¯
“
Nÿ
j“1
Γπpiqja
πpiqj
sπpiqsj
. (34b)
The only way (34a) and (34b) are the same for each s P t1, 2u
N
and Γ P PGN is if M
ij “Mπpiqπpjq for each
i, j “ 1, . . . , N , and this equality need not hold (which would mean that u, when defined in this way, is not
an aggregate payoff function in the sense of Definition 3). Therefore, by enlarging PN via (30) and defining
u via (31), we can essentially “factor out” the asymmetry present in the payoff function defined by (33). In
other words, PN contains all of the non-strategy information that distinguishes the players’ payoffs.
Due to the separation of timescales in the selection processes we consider here, it often happens that u is
independent of a portion of the population state space. More specifically, the population state space can be
decomposed into an interaction state space, EN , and a dispersal state space, DN , such that PN “ EN ˆDN
and
u
´
s, pE ,Dq
¯
“ u
´
s,
`
E ,D 1
˘ ¯
(35)
for each s P SN , E P EN , and D ,D
1 P DN . This decomposition generalizes models with separate interaction
and dispersal graphs (Taylor et al., 2007; Ohtsuki et al., 2007a,b; Pacheco et al., 2009; De´barre et al., 2014).
The interaction state, for instance, might consist of a population structure and other information (such as
phenotypes):
Example 9 (Phenotype space, continued). Antal et al. (2009) study the evolution of cooperation in phe-
notype space. In terms of (24), each player has a strategy, A1 (“cooperate”) or A2 (“defect”), as well as
a one-dimensional phenotype, which is simply an integer. If an interaction state has a graph as its spatial
structure, then the interaction state space is EN :“ P
G
N ˆ Z
N . Thus, an interaction structure consists of a
graph, Γ P PGN , and an N -tuple of phenotypes r “ pr1, . . . , rN q P Z
N , where ri is the phenotype of player i
in the population. The phenotypes affect the strategies of the players as follows: cooperators cooperate with
other neighbors with whom they share a phenotype, and they defect otherwise. Defectors always defect,
regardless of phenotypic similarities. For each i, the payoff function, u : t1, 2u
N
ˆ EN Ñ R
N , satisfies
ui
´
ps1, . . . , sN q , pΓ, rq
¯
“
Nÿ
j“1
Γij
´
δri,rjasisj `
`
1´ δri,rj
˘
a22
¯
, (36)
where δri,rj is 1 if ri “ rj and 0 otherwise. Therefore, one can directly implement the influence of phenotype
on strategy using the interaction state space, EN , and u.
3.3. Update rules. We saw at the beginning of §3 that for a game with n strategies in a well-mixed
population, the state space for an evolutionary process is
SN{SN –
!
pk1, . . . , knq P t0, 1, . . . , Nu
N
: k1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` kn “ N
)
. (37)
On the other hand, between update steps, one can simply fix some enumeration of the population and
represent the state of the evolutionary process by an element of SN , i.e. a representative of the state
space, SN{SN . In populations with spatial structure, mutation rates, phenotypic differences, etc., this
representative contains more information than simply a strategy profile; it also contains information about
the population state. In other words, at a fixed point in time, the state of the evolutionary process can be
described by an element of SN ˆ PN , where PN is a population state space. Of course, the evolutionary
dynamics of the process should not be affected by the choice of enumeration of the players in each time step,
which means that the state space for the evolutionary process is naturally the quotient space
S :“
`
SN ˆ PN
˘
{SN , (38)
generalizing the state space of Eq. (37) to structured populations.
We now wish to describe the update step of an evolutionary process on S. This update rule should not
depend on how the players in the updated population are labeled. For example, if a player dies and is replaced
by the offspring of another player, then the result of this death and replacement is a new element of S. In
other words, the new population does not lie in SN ˆPN in a natural way; we must choose an enumeration
of the players in order to get an element of SN ˆ PN , and this enumeration may be arbitrary. Therefore,
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given the current strategy profile and population state, an update rule should give a probability distribution
over the state space of the process, S (not SN ˆPN). On the other hand, in order to update the state of the
population, one needs to speak of the likelihood that each player in the current state is updated. To do so,
one may choose a representative of the current state of the process, ps,Pq P SN ˆPN , which is equivalent to
choosing a labeling of the players at that point in time. Again, the distribution over S (conditioned on the
current state of the process) should not depend on the labeling of the current state. Finally, this distribution
over S is a function of the fitness profile of the population; each player has a real-valued fitness, and the
update rule depends on these values. Putting these components together, we have:
Definition 4 (Update rule). An update rule is a map,
U : RN ÝÑ K
`
SN ˆ PN , S
˘
, (39)
that satisfies the symmetry condition
U rπxs
´
pπs, πPq , E
¯
“ U rxs
´
ps,Pq , E
¯
(40)
for each π P SN , x P R
N , ps,Pq P SN ˆ PN , and E P F pSq, where F pSq is the quotient σ-algebra on
S “
`
SN ˆ PN
˘
{SN derived from F pSq and F pPN q.
That is, an update rule is a family of Markov kernels,!
U rxs
)
xPRN
Ď K
`
SN ˆ PN , S
˘
, (41)
parametrized by the fitness profiles of the population, x P RN , and satisfying Eq. (40). Eq. (40) says that
the update does not depend on how the current population is represented. In other words, if ps,Pq and
pπs, πPq are two representatives of the same population at time t, then the update rule treats ps,Pq and
pπs, πPq as the same population. (If x is the fitness profile corresponding to the representative ps,Pq, then
πx is the fitness profile corresponding to the representative pπs, πPq.)
Together, an update rule and aggregate payoff function define a Markov chain on S whose kernel, κ, is
constructed as follows: Let f : R Ñ R be a payoff-to-fitness map, i.e. a function that converts a player’s
payoff to fitness. Consider the function
F : RN ÝÑ RN
: px1, . . . , xN q ÞÝÑ
´
f px1q , . . . , f pxN q
¯
, (42)
which converts payoff profiles to fitness profiles. If u : SN ˆPN Ñ R
N is an aggregate payoff function, then,
for ps,Pq P SN ˆ PN and E P F pSq, we let
κ
´
ps,Pq mod SN , E
¯
:“ U
”
F
´
u ps,Pq
¯ı´
ps,Pq , E
¯
. (43)
κ is well defined since, for each π P SN ,
κ
´
pπs, πPq mod SN , E
¯
“ U
”
F
´
u pπs, πPq
¯ı´
pπs, πPq , E
¯
“ U
”
πF
´
u ps,Pq
¯ı´
pπs, πPq , E
¯
“ U
”
F
´
u ps,Pq
¯ı ´
ps,Pq , E
¯
“ κ
´
ps,Pq mod SN , E
¯
, (44)
where the second and third lines come from Eqs. (27) and (40), respectively.
3.3.1. Update pre-rules. Despite the fact that the evolutionary processes we seek to model here naturally
have S “
`
SN ˆ PN
˘
{SN for a state space, many evolutionary processes in the literature are defined directly
on SN ˆPN (see Allen and Tarnita, 2012). Update rules are sometimes cumbersome to write out explicitly,
and defining a Markov chain on SN ˆ PN instead of on
`
SN ˆ PN
˘
{SN can simplify the presentation of
the transition kernel. In this context, the notion of “update rule” still makes sense, but we instead call it an
update pre-rule to distinguish it from the update rule of Definition 4:
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Definition 5 (Update pre-rule). An update pre-rule is a map,
U0 : R
N ÝÑ K
`
SN ˆ PN , S
N ˆ PN
˘
, (45)
such that for each π P SN , x P R
N , ps,Pq P SN ˆ PN , and E P F pSq,
U0 rπxs
´
pπs, πPq , E
¯
“ U0 rxs
´
ps,Pq , τE
¯
(46)
for some τ P SN .
In many cases, the permutation τ is just π´1, i.e.
U0 rπxs
´
pπs, πPq , πE
¯
“ U0 rxs
´
ps,Pq , E
¯
(47)
for each π P SN . However, all that an evolutionary process on S
N ˆ PN really requires is that if state
pπs, πPq is updated to ps1,Pq, then state ps,Pq is updated to pτs1, τP 1q for some τ . To relate Definitions
4 and 5, consider the projection map,
Π : SN ˆ PN ÝÑ
`
SN ˆ PN
˘
{SN “ S
: ps,Pq ÞÝÑ ps,Pq mod SN . (48)
Π gives rise to a pushforward map on measures,
Π˚ : ∆
`
SN ˆ PN
˘
ÝÑ ∆ pSq
: µ ÞÝÑ µ ˝Π´1, (49)
which can be used to naturally derive an update rule from an update pre-rule:
Proposition 1. An update pre-rule canonically defines an update rule.
Proof. Let U0 be an update pre-rule and consider the map
Π˚U0 : R
N ÝÑ K
`
SN ˆ PN , S
˘
: x ÞÝÑ
!
ps,Pq ÞÑ Π˚U0 rxs
´
ps,Pq ,´
¯)
. (50)
For π P SN , x P R, ps,Pq P S
N ˆ PN , and E P F pSq, there exists τ P SN such that
pΠ˚U0q rπxs
´
pπs, πPq , E
¯
“ U0 rπxs
´
pπs, πPq ,Π´1E
¯
“ U0 rxs
´
ps,Pq , τΠ´1E
¯
“ U0 rxs
´
ps,Pq ,Π´1E
¯
“ pΠ˚U0q rxs
´
ps,Pq , E
¯
, (51)
so Π˚U0 is an update rule, which completes the proof. 
In other words, an update pre-rule can be “pushed forward” to an update rule. If S and PN are finite,
then an update rule can also be “pulled back” to an update pre-rule:
Proposition 2. If U is an update rule and S and PN are finite, then there exists an update pre-rule, U0,
such that Π˚U0 “ U. That is, U can be “pulled back” to U0.
Proof. From U, we define a map, U0, as follows:
U0 rxs
´
ps,Pq ,
`
s1,P 1
˘ ¯
“
1
|orbSN ps
1,P 1q|
U rxs
´
ps,Pq ,
`
s1,P 1
˘
mod SN
¯
. (52)
For π P SN , we see from Eq. (40) that
U0 rπxs
´
pπs, πPq ,
`
s1,P 1
˘ ¯
“
1
|orbSN ps
1,P 1q|
U rπxs
´
pπs, πPq ,
`
s1,P 1
˘
mod SN
¯
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“
1
|orbSN ps
1,P 1q|
U rxs
´
ps,Pq ,
`
s1,P 1
˘
mod SN
¯
“ U0 rxs
´
ps,Pq ,
`
s1,P 1
˘ ¯
. (53)
Therefore, U0 satisfies Eq. (46) and defines an update pre-rule. Since
pΠ˚U0q rxs
´
ps,Pq ,
`
s1,P 1
˘
mod SN
¯
“ U0 rxs
´
ps,Pq ,Π´1
´ `
s1,P 1
˘
mod SN
¯¯
“
ÿ
ps2,P2qPorbSN ps
1,P1q
U0 rxs
´
ps,Pq ,
`
s2,P2
˘ ¯
“
ÿ
ps2,P2qPorbSN ps
1,P1q
1
|orbSN ps
2,P2q|
U rxs
´
ps,Pq ,
`
s2,P2
˘
mod SN
¯
“
ÿ
ps2,P2qPorbSN ps
1,P1q
1
|orbSN ps
1,P 1q|
U rxs
´
ps,Pq ,
`
s1,P 1
˘
mod SN
¯
“ U rxs
´
ps,Pq ,
`
s1,P 1
˘
mod SN
¯
, (54)
it follows that Π˚U0 “ U, which completes the proof. 
Remark 2. The proof of Proposition 2 requires that
E0 P F
`
SN ˆ PN
˘
ùñ ΠE0 P F pSq . (55)
In the case that SN ˆPN is finite, the singletons generate the canonical (i.e. discrete) σ-algebra on S
N ˆPN ,
and the image Π ps1,P 1q “ ps1,P 1q mod SN is measurable for each ps
1,P 1q P SN ˆ PN . In general, the
image of a measurable set need not be measurable. However, the purpose of introducing an update pre-rule
is to provide an alternative way to obtain an update rule. An update rule defines a Markov chain on the
true space of the evolutionary process, S; pulling this chain back to SN ˆ PN is not necessary.
An update pre-rule defines a Markov chain on SN ˆ PN whose kernel, κ0, satisfies
κ0
´
ps,Pq , E0
¯
:“ U0
”
F
´
u ps,Pq
¯ı´
ps,Pq , E0
¯
(56)
for each ps,Pq P SN ˆPN and E0 P F
`
SN ˆ PN
˘
. Denote by Π˚κ0 the kernel of the Markov chain defined
by Π˚U0. The stationary distribution(s) of κ0 can be “pushed forward” to stationary distribution(s) of Π˚κ0
via the pushforward map of Eq. (49):
Proposition 3. If µ is a stationary distribution of the Markov chain defined by κ0, then Π˚µ is a stationary
distribution of the Markov chain defined by Π˚κ0.
Proof. Suppose that µ is a stationary distribution of κ0, i.e.
µ pE0q “
ż
sPSNˆPN
κ0 ps, E0q dµ psq (57)
for each E0 P F
`
SN ˆ PN
˘
. For each E P F pSq, it follows thatż
s mod SNPS
pΠ˚κ0q ps mod SN , Eq d pΠ˚µq ps mod SNq
“
ż
sPSNˆPN
pΠ˚κ0q ps mod SN , Eq dµ psq
“
ż
sPSNˆPN
κ0
`
s,Π´1E
˘
dµ psq
“ µ
`
Π´1E
˘
“ pΠ˚µq pEq (58)
by the change of variables formula and Eq. (57), which completes the proof. 
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Thus, the passage from an update pre-rule to an update rule via Π˚ is compatible with the steady states
of the chains defined by κ0 and Π˚κ0, respectively.
3.3.2. Examples. We now give several classical examples of update pre-rules and rules:
Example 10 (Death-birth process). Suppose that S is finite and that PN is the finite subset of P
G
N consisting
of the undirected, unweighted graphs on N vertices (with no other restrictions–this set contains regular
graphs, scale-free networks, etc.). In each step of a death-birth process, a player is selected uniformly at
random from the population for death. The neighbors (determined by a graph, Γ P PN) then compete to fill
the vacancy: a neighbor–say, player j–is chosen for reproduction with probability proportional to relative
fitness, xj . The offspring of this player inherits the strategy of the parent and fills the vacancy left by the
deceased player. The population state (i.e. the graph) is left unchanged by this process. We define an
update pre-rule for this process by giving transition probabilities from SN ˆ PN to itself when the N ´ 1
surviving players in each round retain their labels. That is, if ps,Γq is the state of the process and player
i is chosen for death, Γ remains the same and only the ith coordinate of s is updated in order to obtain a
new state, ps1,Γq. Thus, for two states, ps,Γq , ps1,Γ1q P SN ˆ PN , it must be the case that Γ “ Γ
1 for there
to be a nonzero probability of transitioning from ps,Γq to ps1,Γ1q. The probability of choosing player i for
death is 1{N , and, if this player is chosen for death, a transition is possible only if sj “ s
1
j for each j ‰ i.
The probability that player i is replaced by the offspring of a player using si’ isÿ
j‰i
δsj ,s1i
˜
Γjixjř
j‰i Γjixj
¸
, (59)
where δsj ,s1i is 1 if sj “ s
1
i and 0 otherwise. Thus, for x P R
N , the transition probability from ps,Γq to ps1,Γ1q
is given by the update pre-rule, U0, defined by
U0 rxs
´
ps,Γq ,
`
s1,Γ1
˘ ¯
:“ δΓ,Γ1
Nÿ
i“1
˜ź
j‰i
δsj ,s1j
¸ˆ
1
N
˙˜ř
j‰i δsj ,s1iΓjixjř
j‰i Γjixj
¸
. (60)
U0 is indeed an update pre-rule since, for each π P SN ,
U0 rπxs
´
pπs, πΓq ,
`
πs1, πΓ1
˘¯
“ δπΓ,πΓ1
Nÿ
i“1
˜ź
j‰i
δsπpjq,s1πpjq
¸ˆ
1
N
˙˜ř
j‰i δsπpjq,s1πpiqΓπpjqπpiqxπpjqř
j‰i Γπpjqπpiqxπpjq
¸
“ δΓ,Γ1
Nÿ
i“1
¨˝ ź
j‰πpiq
δsj ,s1j
‚˛ˆ 1
N
˙˜ř
j‰πpiq δsj ,s1πpiqΓjπpiqxjř
j‰πpiq Γjπpiqxj
¸
“ δΓ,Γ1
Nÿ
i“1
˜ź
j‰i
δsj ,s1j
¸ˆ
1
N
˙˜ř
j‰i δsj ,s1iΓjixjř
j‰i Γjixj
¸
“ U0 rxs
´
ps,Γq ,
`
s1,Γ1
˘ ¯
. (61)
This example verifies in detail the symmetry condition of an update pre-rule, Eq. (46). Calculations for
other processes are similar.
Example 11 (Wright-Fisher process). In contrast to the Moran process of Example 1 and the death-
birth process of Example 10, one could also consider a process in which the entire population is updated
synchronously. For example, in the Wright-Fisher process (Ewens, 2004; Imhof and Nowak, 2006), the
population is updated as follows: A player–say, player i–is first selected for reproduction with probability
proportional to fitness. The offspring of this player inherits the strategy of the parent with probability 1´ εi
and takes on a novel strategy uniformly at random with probability εi. The mutation rate of the offspring
is inherited from the parent (so that the offspring’s offspring will also mutate with probability εi). This
process is then repeated until there are N new offspring, and these offspring constitute the new population.
Thus, one update step of the Wright-Fisher process involves updating the entire population.
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Let S be finite and let m be some finite subset of r0, 1s. The population state space for this version of the
Wright-Fisher process is PN :“ m
N . That is, a population state is an N -tuple of strategy-mutation rates,
ε, with εi the mutation rate for player i. We define an update pre-rule, U0, as follows: for x P R
N and
ps, εq , ps1, ε1q P SN ˆ PN , let
U0 rxs
´
ps, εq ,
`
s1, ε1
˘ ¯
“
Nź
i“1
Nÿ
j“1
δε1
i
,εj
ˆ
xj
x1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` xN
˙„
δs1
i
,sj p1´ εjq ` εj
ˆ
1
n
˙
. (62)
For each π, τ P SN , x P R
N , and ps, εq , ps1, ε1q P SN ˆ PN , it is readily verified that
U0 rπxs
´
pπs, πεq ,
`
τs1, τε1
˘ ¯
“ U0 rxs
´
ps, εq ,
`
s1, ε1
˘¯
. (63)
Therefore, the resulting update rule, U :“ Π˚U0, satisfies
U rxs
´
ps, εq mod SN ,
`
s1, ε1
˘
mod SN
¯
“
ˇˇ
orbSN
`
s1, ε1
˘ˇˇ Nź
i“1
Nÿ
j“1
δε1i,εj
ˆ
xj
x1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` xN
˙„
δs1i,sj p1´ εjq ` εj
ˆ
1
n
˙
. (64)
Consider the simple case ε “ ε1 “ 0 (meaning there are no strategy mutations). If k1r denotes the frequency
of strategy r in state s1 for r “ 1, . . . , n, then |StabSN ps
1,0q| “ k11! ¨ ¨ ¨ k
1
n!, which means that
U rxs
´
ps,0q mod SN ,
`
s1,0
˘
mod SN
¯
“
ˇˇ
orbSN
`
s1,0
˘ˇˇ Nź
i“1
Nÿ
j“1
ˆ
xj
x1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` xN
˙
δs1
i
,sj
“
|SN |
|StabSN ps
1,0q|
Nź
i“1
Nÿ
j“1
ˆ
xj
x1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` xN
˙
δs1i,sj
“
ˆ
N
k1
1
, . . . , k1n
˙ Nź
i“1
Nÿ
j“1
ˆ
xj
x1 ` ¨ ¨ ¨ ` xN
˙
δs1
i
,sj , (65)
where the third line was obtained using the orbit-stabilizer theorem (see Knapp, 2006). Eq. (65) is just the
classical formula for the transition probabilities of the Wright-Fisher process based on multinomial sampling
(Kingman, 1980; Durrett, 2002; Der et al., 2011).
Example 12 (Pairwise comparison process). In each of our examples so far, both S and PN have been
finite. Since our theory allows for these sets to be measurable, we now give an example of an evolutionary
process whose strategy space is continuous. Let S “ r0,Ks for some K ą 0. This interval might be the
strategy space for a public goods game, for instance, with K the maximum amount any one player may
contribute to the public good. As in Examples 1 and 11, let PN :“ m
N for some finite subset, m, of r0, 1s;
an element of PN is just a profile of mutation rates, ε.
In each step of a pairwise comparison process, a player–say, player i–is selected uniformly at random from
the population to evaluate his or her strategy. Another player–say, player j–is then chosen uniformly at
random from the rest of the population as a model player. With probability 1 ´ εi, the focal player takes
into account the model player and probabilistically updates his or her strategy as follows: if xi (resp. xj)
is the fitness of the focal (resp. model) player, and if β ě 0 is the selection intensity, then the focal player
imitates the model player with probability
1
1` e´βpxj´xiq
(66)
and retains his or her current strategy with probability
1
1` e´βpxi´xjq
(67)
(Szabo´ and To˝ke, 1998). On the other hand, with probability εi the focal player ignores the model player
completely. In this case, the focal player “explores” and adopts a new strategy from the interval r0,Ks
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probabilistically according to a truncated Gaussian distribution centered at si (the current strategy of the
focal player). For some specified variance, σ2, this truncated Gaussian distribution has for a density function
φsi pxq :“
˜ż K
0
exp
˜
´
py ´ siq
2
2σ2
¸
dy
¸´1
exp
˜
´
px´ siq
2
2σ2
¸
. (68)
The parameter σ may be interpreted as a measure of how venturesome a player is, with cautious exploration
corresponding to small σ and risky exploration corresponding to large σ. The density function, φsi , defines
a probability measure,
Φsi : F pSq ÝÑ r0, 1s
: E ÞÝÑ
ż
E
φsi pxq dx. (69)
If player i ignores the model player, then he or she adopts a strategy from E P F pSq with probability Φsi pEq.
Thus, a player who explores is more likely to adopt a strategy close to his or her current strategy than one
farther away. For β ě 0, let
gβ pxq :“
1
1` e´βx
(70)
be the logistic function. (In terms of this function, the probability that a focal player with fitness xi imitates
a model player with fitness xj is gβ pxj ´ xiq.) We assemble these components into an update pre-rule, U0,
as follows: For x P RN , ps, εq P SN ˆPN , and a measurable rectangle, E1ˆ¨ ¨ ¨ˆEN ˆE
1 P F pSq
N
ˆF pPN q,
let
U0 rxs
´
ps, εq , E1 ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ EN ˆ E
1
¯
:“ δε
`
E1
˘ Nÿ
i“1
ˆ
1
N
˙˜ź
j‰i
δsj pEjq
¸ÿ
j‰i
ˆ
1
N ´ 1
˙#
εiΦsi pEiq
` p1´ εiq
”
δsj pEiq gβ pxj ´ xiq ` δsi pEiq gβ pxi ´ xjq
ı+
, (71)
and extend this definition additively to disjoint unions of measurable rectangles. For each x P RN and
ps, εq P SN ˆ PN , one can verify that U0 rxs
´
ps, εq ,´
¯
extends to a measure on SN ˆ PN by the Hahn-
Kolmogorov theorem, which we also denote by U0 rxs
´
ps, εq ,´
¯
. It is readily verified that U0 is an update
pre-rule, so U0 extends to an update rule, Π˚U0, by Proposition 1. This example illustrates how the strategy
mutations might themselves depend on the strategies (as opposed to simply being uniform random variables
on S as they were in the previous examples).
In Examples 1, 11, and 12, we considered processes with heterogeneous mutation rates (meaning εi depends
on i). In Examples 1 and 11, there is a nonzero probability of transitioning from a state with heterogeneous
mutation rates to a state with homogeneous mutation rates. For instance, in the Wright-Fisher process
of Example 11, if ps, εq is a state such that εℓ ‰ εℓ1 for some ℓ and ℓ
1, and if ps1, ε1q is a state satisfying
s11 “ s
1
2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ s
1
N “ sℓ and ε
1
1 “ ε
1
2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ ε
1
N “ εℓ, then there is a nonzero probability of transitioning
from ps, εq to ps1, ε1q provided xℓ ą 0. Thus, the population state, which is simply of profile of mutation
rates, can change from generation to generation. In contrast, the population state of Example 12 cannot
change from generation to generation since strategies are imitated and mutation rates are not inherited. In
other words, much of the biological meaning behind the quantities appearing in the population state are
encoded in the dynamics of the process via the update rule.
In a more formal setting, let κ be the transition kernel obtained from an update rule via Eq. (43). From
the projection Π2 : S
N ˆ PN Ñ PN , we obtain a maprΠ2 : `SN ˆ PN˘ {SN ÝÑ PN{SN
: ps,Pq mod SN ÞÝÑ P mod SN . (72)
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rΠ2 gives us a pushforward map, ´rΠ2¯
˚
: ∆ pSq Ñ ∆ pPN{SNq, which we use to formalize the intuition
behind “static” and “dynamic” population states:
Definition 6 (Static and dynamic population states). A population state, P, in a population state space,
PN , is static relative to κ if, for each s P S
N ,´rΠ2¯
˚
κ
´
ps,Pq mod SN ,´
¯
“ δP mod SN , (73)
where δP mod SN denotes the Dirac measure on ∆ pPN{SN q centered at P mod SN . Otherwise, if κ is not
static relative to κ, we say that P is dynamic relative to κ.
In Examples 10 and 12, every population state is static. In Examples 1 and 11, only the population states
(i.e. mutation profiles) with ε1 “ ε2 “ ¨ ¨ ¨ “ εN are static.
4. Stochastic selection processes with variable population size
Suppose now that the population size is dynamic, and let N Ď t0, 1, 2, . . . u be the set of admissible
population sizes. As in §3, let S be the strategy space for each player. Instead of having a single population
state space, we now require the existence of a population state space, PN , for each N P N. The state space
for such a process is
S :“
ğ
ℓPN
`
Sℓ ˆ Pℓ
˘
{Sℓ, (74)
where
Ů
ℓPN
`
Sℓ ˆ Pℓ
˘
{Sℓ denotes the disjoint union of the spaces
`
Sℓ ˆ Pℓ
˘
{Sℓ. Instead of a single
aggregate payoff function and update rule, we now require that there be an aggregate payoff function,
uN : SN ˆ PN Ñ R
N , and an update rule, UN : RN Ñ K
`
SN ˆ PN , S
˘
, for each admissible population
size, N P N. If the population currently has size N , then uN determines the payoffs to the players in the
interaction step, and UN updates the population (possibly to one of a different size). Of course, for each
π P SN , x P R
N , s P SN , P P PN , and E P F pSq, these functions must satisfy
uN pπs, πPq “ πuN ps,Pq ; (75a)
U
N rπxs
´
pπs, πPq , E
¯
“ UN rxs
´
ps,Pq , E
¯
(75b)
just as they did in Definitions 3 and 4, respectively.
Finally, we have the definition of a stochastic selection process in its full generality:
Definition 7 (Stochastic selection process). A stochastic selection process consists of the following compo-
nents:
(1) a set of admissible population sizes, N Ď t0, 1, 2, . . . u;
(2) a measurable strategy space, S;
(3) for each N P N, a population state space, PN ;
(4) for each N P N, an aggregate payoff function, uN : SN ˆ PN Ñ R
N ;
(5) a payoff-to-fitness function, f : RÑ R;
(6) for each N P N, an update rule, UN : RN Ñ K
`
SN ˆ PN , S
˘
, where
S :“
ğ
ℓPN
`
Sℓ ˆ Pℓ
˘
{Sℓ. (76)
The components of a stochastic selection process produce a Markov chain on S whose kernel, κ, is defined
as follows: for N P N, ps,Pq P SN ˆ PN , and E P S,
κ
´
ps,Pq mod SN , E
¯
“ UN
”
F
´
uN ps,Pq
¯ı ´
ps,Pq , E
¯
. (77)
It is readily verified that κ is well defined (see Eq. (44)).
Remark 3. The payoff-to-fitness function, f , in requirement (5) of a stochastic selection process, is not
strictly necessary. It could instead be absorbed into either the payoff function (which would then be a fitness
function) or the update rule (which would then be a family of transition kernels parametrized by payoff
profiles rather than by fitness profiles). We include this function as a part of a stochastic selection process
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for three reasons: (1) having an aggregate payoff function instead of an aggregate fitness function allows
for a more straightforward comparison to the theory of stochastic games; (2) having an update rule be a
family of transition kernels parametrized by fitness simplifies its presentation (see §3.3.2); and (3) payoff-to-
fitness functions are often explicitly mentioned in models of evolutionary games in the literature. Tuning the
selection strength of a process, for instance, amounts to modifying the payoff-to-fitness function, so including
this function in a stochastic selection process allows one to more explicitly separate the various components
of a selection process.
Remark 4. The notion of update pre-rule also makes sense for populations of variable size, although one
must define the symmetry condition, Eq. (46), with greater care. If N is the set of admissible population
sizes, then we require–for each N P N–a map
U
N
0 : R
N ÝÑ K
˜
SN ˆ PN ,
ğ
ℓPN
Sℓ ˆ Pℓ
¸
. (78)
For each N P N, there is an action of SN on
Ů
ℓPN S
ℓ ˆ Pℓ defined by
π ps,Pq “
#
pπs, πPq ps,Pq P SN ˆ PN ;
ps,Pq ps,Pq R SN ˆ PN .
(79)
From the set of groups tSNuNPN, one can construct the free product,
SN :“ ˚
NPN
SN , (80)
which is just the analogue of disjoint union in the category of groups (see Knapp, 2006). Collectively, the
actions of SN ˆ PN on
Ů
ℓPN S
ℓ ˆ Pℓ defined by Eq. (79) (over all N P N) result in a (measurable) action
of SN on
Ů
ℓPN S
ℓ ˆ Pℓ. For
 
UN0
(
NPN
to define a collection of update pre-rules, we require that for each
N P N, π P SN , x P R
N , ps,Pq P SN ˆ PN and E0 P F
`Ů
ℓPN S
ℓ ˆ Pℓ
˘
, there exists τ P SN such that
U0 rπxs
´
pπs, πPq , E0
¯
“ U0 rxs
´
ps,Pq , τE0
¯
. (81)
The reason we require τ to be in the free product, SN, instead of just in SN for some N P N, is that it need
not hold that E0 P F
`
SN ˆ PN
˘
for some N P N. E0 could be some complicated measurable set consisting
of elements of SN ˆPN for several N P N, so we need some way of relabeling elements S
N ˆPN for several
values of N P N simultaneously. Extending the action of SN on S
N ˆPN to
Ů
ℓPN S
ℓˆPℓ via (79), in order
to form the free product, SN, via Eq. (80), accomplishes this task.
Analogues of Propositions 1, 2, and 3 also hold in this context, but we do not go through the details here;
the proofs are essentially the same as they were in §3.3.1.
5. Discussion
We use the term “selection process” instead of “evolutionary game” in order to emphasize that the
update step is based on the principles of natural selection. Several types of adaptive processes appearing
in the economics literature have been referred to as evolutionary games. Best-response dynamics of Ellison
(1993) is a procedure in which, at each round, the players update their strategies based on the best responses
to their opponents in the previous round. This process is known to converge to a Nash equilibrium of the
game. Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) define a similar process called regret matching that leads to a correlated
equilibrium of the game. These processes can be phrased as stochastic games (along with appropriate
strategies), but they are not stochastic selection processes, as we now illustrate with best-response dynamics:
Suppose N “ 2. Let S “ tA,Bu and let u : S2 Ñ R2 be the payoff function for a game between two
players. If best-response dynamics in this population defines a stochastic selection process, then there exists
a population state space, P2, and an update rule, U, such that the transition kernel of the resulting Markov
chain, κu, satisfies
κu
´
ps,Pq , E
¯
“ U ru psqs
´
ps,Pq , E
¯
(82)
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for each ps,Pq P S2 ˆ P2 and E P F pSq. In other words, κu depends on u insofar as U depends on R
2.
Consider the two payoff functions, u, v : S2 Ñ R2, defined byˆ
u pA,Aq u pA,Bq
u pB,Aq u pB,Bq
˙
“
ˆ
2 2
1 1
˙
; (83a)ˆ
v pA,Aq v pA,Bq
v pB,Aq v pB,Bq
˙
“
ˆ
2 0
1 1
˙
. (83b)
Since u pB,Bq “ v pB,Bq “ 1, it follows that for s “ pB,Bq and any P P P2,
κu
´´
pB,Bq ,P
¯
, E
¯
“ U ru pB,Bqs
´´
pB,Bq ,P
¯
, E
¯
“ U rv pB,Bqs
´´
pB,Bq ,P
¯
, E
¯
“ κv
´´
pB,Bq ,P
¯
, E
¯
. (84)
Thus, the strategy profile pB,Bq must be updated by best-response dynamics in the same way for both
functions, u and v. However, best-response dynamics actually results in different updates of pB,Bq for these
two games: for u, the profile pB,Bq is updated to pA,Aq; for v, the profile pB,Bq is updated to pB,Bq (it
is already a Nash equilibrium). The key observation is that, while the Markov chain defined by a stochastic
selection process depends on the aggregate payoff function, u, the update rule is independent of u. In
contrast, the update step in best-response dynamics clearly depends on u. In a stochastic selection process,
the only role of the aggregate payoff function is to determine the fitness profile (which is then passed to the
update rule).
An update rule in the classical sense, vaguely speaking, generally consists of information about births and
deaths (or imitation). Choosing to represent the strategies of the players in the population as an N -tuple,
s P SN , is just a mathematical convenience; the update rule is independent of how the players are labeled.
We defined the notion of update pre-rule (Definition 5) in order to relate stochastic selection processes to the
way in which evolutionary processes are frequently modeled–as Markov chains on SN (or, more generally,
on SN ˆ PN ). In many cases, an update pre-rule is simpler to write down explicitly than an update rule
since one can choose a convenient enumeration of the players in each time step. We showed that an update
pre-rule can always be “pushed forward” to an update rule, so it is sufficient to give an update pre-rule in
place of an update rule in the definition of stochastic selection process. However, an update rule is the true
mathematical formalization of an evolutionary update in this context since it is independent of the labeling
of the players.
Stochastic selection processes encompass existing models of selection such as the evolutionary game Markov
chain of Wage (2010) and the evolutionary Markov chain of Allen and Tarnita (2012). Wage (2010) considers
a Markov chain arising from probability distributions over a collection of inheritance rules. An inheritance
rule is a map, I : t1, . . . , Nu Ñ t1, . . . , N,mu, that designates the source of a player’s strategy: if I piq “ j ‰
m, then player i inherits his or her strategy from player j; if I piq “ m, then player i’s strategy is the result of
a random mutation (assumed to be uniform over the strategy set). Similarly, Allen and Tarnita (2012) model
evolution in populations with fixed size and structure using replacement events. A replacement event is a pair,
pR,αq, consisting of a collection, R Ď t1, . . . , Nu, of players who are replaced and a rule, α : RÑ t1, . . . , Nu,
indicating the parent of each offspring involved in the replacement. These frameworks provide good models
for many classical evolutionary processes, but they do not account for genetic processes with crossover, for
instance. Moreover, one could imagine a cultural process in which a player updates his or her strategy
based on some complicated synthesis of many strategies in the population. Our framework generalizes these
models, taking into account arbitrary strategy spaces, payoff functions, population structures, and update
rules.
McAvoy and Hauert (2015b) define the notion of a homogeneous evolutionary game, which, informally,
means that any two states consisting of a single A-mutant in a monomorphic B-population are equivalent.
More specifically, suppose that a population state consists of a graph and a profile of mutation rates; that is,
PN “ P
G
Nˆm
N for some finite subset, m, of r0, 1s. If s, s1 P SN , and if π P SN satisfies πΓ “ Γ and πε “ ε for
some Γ P PGN and ε P m
N , then McAvoy and Hauert (2015b) argue that the states ps, pΓ, εqq and pπs, pΓ, εqq
are evolutionarily equivalent in the sense that π induces an automorphism of the Markov chain on SN ˆPN
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that sends ps, pΓ, εqq to pπs, pΓ, εqq. This result is a special case of an observation that is completely obvious
in the context of stochastic selection processes: if π P Aut pPq for some P in a population state space,
PN , then the representatives ps,Pq and pπs,Pq “ pπs, πPq define exactly the same state in S. Therefore,
working on the true state space of an evolutionary process, S, helps to elucidate structural symmetries that
are not as clear when working with a Markov chain on SN ˆ PN that is defined by an update pre-rule.
In the definition of a population state space (Definition 1), we require a measurable space, PN , along with
a measurable action of SN on PN . Naturally, this setup raises the question of what types of SN -actions
one can put on PN while still retaining the desired properties of an evolutionary process. If one were to
take an update rule, U, and then arbitrarily change the action of SN on PN , then U need not remain an
update rule under this new action. For example, let Γ0 P PGN be the Frucht graph, which is an undirected,
unweighted, regular graph with N “ 12 vertices and no nontrivial symmetries (Frucht, 1939). In other words,
if Γ0
πpiqπpjq “ Γ
0
ij for each i, j “ 1, . . . , 12, then π “ id. Instead of the standard action of SN on P
G
N , one could
instead declare that SN acts trivially on P
G
N ; in particular, π‹Γ “ Γ for each π P SN and Γ P P
G
N . If U is the
update rule for the death-birth process (see Example 10), then it follows that the representatives
`
s,Γ0
˘
and`
πs, π ‹ Γ0
˘
“
`
πs,Γ0
˘
define the same point in the state space, S. For the (frequency-dependent) Snowdrift
Game, all 12 states consisting of a single cooperator in a population of defectors give rise to different fixation
probabilities for cooperators (see McAvoy and Hauert, 2015b). Therefore, it cannot be the case that U
defines a Markov chain on S via Eq. (43); in particular, U is no longer a well-defined update rule under the
new action, ‹, of SN on PN .
The dynamics of a stochastic selection process, which are obtained via its update rule, encode much of
the biological meaning of the components that constitute the population state space. In both of Examples
11 and 12, the population state space was PN :“ m
N for some finite subset, m, of r0, 1s. On the other hand,
the interpretations of these mutation rates were completely different in these two processes: in Example 11,
the mutation applied to the offspring of reproducing players; in Example 12, the mutation was interpreted
as “exploration” and applied to a player who was chosen to update his or her strategy. One could even
consider different implementations of mutation rates in the same process: in a genetic process based on
reproduction, a player’s strategy-mutation rate may be inherited from the parent (as in Examples 1 and
11), or, alternatively, it may be determined by a player’s spatial location (see McAvoy and Hauert, 2015b).
These details are encoded entirely in the update rule.
Although the framework we present here is clearly aimed at evolutionary games used to describe natural
selection, related processes that are not technically “games” may also constitute stochastic selection pro-
cesses. Evolutionary algorithms, for example, form an important subclass of stochastic selection processes.
These algorithms seek to apply the principles of natural selection to solve search and optimization problems
(Ba¨ck, 1996). Evolutionary algorithms typically do not have population state spaces, which, in our context,
means that PN can be taken to be a singleton equipped with the trivial action of SN . A popular type
of evolutionary algorithm, known as a genetic algorithm, involves representing the elements of the search
space, i.e. the genomes in S, as sequences of binary digits. Each genome is then assigned a fitness based on
its viability as a solution to the problem at hand. (Unlike in biological populations, the fitness landscape,
although complex, is inherently static and does not depend on the other members of the population.) The
update step, which is commonly designed to mimic sexual reproduction in nature, involves a combination of
selection, crossover, and mutation. A population of genomes is then repeatedly updated until a sufficiently fit
genome appears. Despite the fact that biological reproduction generally involves either one (asexual) or two
(sexual) parents, evolutionary algorithms have been simulated using many parents (Chambers, 1998). Other
components of the update step in some algorithms, such as stochastic universal sampling (Baker, 1987),
elitism (Baluja and Caruana, 1995), and tournament selection (Poli, 2005), are all readily incorporated into
our model of stochastic selection processes.
In Example 12, we saw an evolutionary process with an uncountably infinite state space. A state space
of this sort arises naturally in the public goods game, for instance, where there is a continuous range of
investment levels. This example also illustrates the more complicated ways in which strategy mutations
can be incorporated into an evolutionary process. If a player has a strategy, x P r0,Ks for some K ą 0,
then it may be the case that this player is more likely to “explore” strategies close to x than he or she is
to switch to strategies farther away. A truncated Gaussian random variable on r0,Ks, whose variance is a
measure of how venturesome a player is, captures this type of strategy exploration and is easily incorporated
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into the update rule of an evolutionary process. This type of mutation has appeared in the context of
adaptive dynamics (Doebeli et al., 2004) and, more recently, in a study of stochastic evolutionary branching
(Wakano and Iwasa, 2012), but it has been largely ignored elsewhere in the literature on evolutionary game
theory, where strategy mutations typically involve switching between two strategies or else are governed by
a uniform random variable over the strategy space. Further studies of the dynamics of processes with these
biologically-relevant mutations are certainly warranted.
Our framework makes no assumptions on the cardinality of S and PN ; all that is required is that these
spaces be measurable (and that PN be equipped with an action of SN ). Markov chains on continuous
state spaces have unique stationary distributions under certain circumstances (see Durrett, 2009), but, in
the generality of this framework, it need not be the case that a stationary distribution is unique. Even
if S is finite and there are nonzero strategy-mutation rates, the spatial structure of the population might
be disconnected, resulting in multiple stationary distributions. Particular instances of stochastic selection
processes may have the property that nonzero strategy-mutation rates imply that the Markov chain defined by
the process is irreducible (Fudenberg and Imhof, 2006, 2008; Allen and Tarnita, 2012), but this phenomenon
need not hold in general. Our goal here was not to study the dynamics of any particular subclass of stochastic
selection processes, but rather to formalize what these processes are.
Our general theory of stochastic selection processes provides a mathematical foundation for a broad class
of processes used to describe evolution by means of natural selection in finite populations. Stochastic selection
processes also provide a mathematical framework for processes with variable population size, a topic that
has received surprisingly little attention in the literature. Although many biological interactions have been
modeled using classical games, the differences between stochastic games and stochastic selection processes
illustrate a fundamental distinction between classical and evolutionary game theory. There is still a lot
to discover about the dynamics of selection processes in finite populations (especially those with variable
population size), and our hope is that this framework elucidates the roles of the components of processes
based on natural selection and advances the effort to transform evolution into a mathematical theory.
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